




This paper examines relative power relations in Asia between 
the United States and China while assessing how the United 
States might approach a potential change in the balance of 
power of the region. The United States, under President Trump, 
has enacted numerous policies that target the rise of Chinese 
power, but most appear to be protectionist measures. These 
include the application of tariffs on Chinese imported goods, 
investigations that bypass multilateral institutions on China’s 
coercive economic behavior and the removal of the United States 
from Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. This paper uses 
empirical findings and employs the lens of realism to analyze 
the implications of the Trump Administration’s policies. The 
findings display that President Trump’s policies to date are not 
an effective balance against China’s rising power, and they may 
potentially lead to a decline of the United States’ power in Asia.
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development, China founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank in 2015, of which eighty countries have joined.6 A trade 
route of the size President Xi has in mind would be competitive 
with the Transatlantic trade route dominated by the United 
States, which causes concern in Washington. If the Belt and 
Road Initiative were successfully completed, Chinese currency, 
technical standards and preferences for trade as a whole would be 
more widely accepted throughout the continent.7 Infrastructure 
is a great vehicle for expanding influence, and this project is 
one of the most obvious signs from China that the country 
has a mission of solidifying its position as a great regional 
power. A result of the many recent developments, countries in 
the region see Asia as “increasingly dominated by adversarial 
power relations” between the United States and China.8 
The two fundamental objectives at stake are China’s 
need for economic growth to avoid collapse and the United 
States’ need for maintaining its order to ensure security. For 
now, the United States remains an influential power in Asia. 
But the rise of China has reached a point where the country 
has the ability to change the balance of power of the region 
in its favor over the United States. This is evident through 
its military buildup, activities in the South China Sea, and 
coercive economic diplomacy, amongst other actions.9 
 It is natural for regional hegemons to oppose the rise 
of other hegemons in order to have no competitors for global 
hegemony.10  Therefore, the United States does not want China to 
6  Jennifer Lind, “Life in China’s Asia: What Regional Hegemony Would Look Like,” Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 97, no. 2 (March/April, 2018): 71-82.
7  Jonathan E. Hillman, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later,” (testimony, US 
Senate, Washington, DC, January 25, 2018).
8  op. cit., fn. 2
9  Jake Sullivan, “The World After Trump: How the System Can Endure,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
97, no. 2 (March/April, 2018): 10-19.
10  John J. Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” in Tim Dunnes, eds., International Relations 
Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 71-88.
The Emergence of China and Necessity to Respond
A few decades ago when the United States supported China’s 
rise into the global trading system, it accelerated the country’s 
growth and hastened its rise as a geopolitical rival.1 Over time, 
China privatized state owned enterprises, eliminated tariffs, 
opened up the country to foreign investment and joined the 
World Trade Organization. These actions led to unprecedented 
economic growth, and now China is the second largest economy 
in the world by aggregate GDP.2 During its economic rise, 
China has not always followed the institutional rules that are 
at the heart of the current international system. For example, 
China has taken steps to increase its power in the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in order to serve its own 
purposes and has economically coerced its neighbors.3 It has 
also built up incredible military strength which is used to defend 
its illicit territorial claims of “indisputable sovereignty” over 
land and maritime territory covering most of the South China 
Sea.4 Although many US officials hoped China would one day 
become a responsible stakeholder in the international system, 
it has not behaved in a way that satisfies this expectation. 
What’s more, President Xi Jinping and the Communist 
Party of China continue to push forward expansion plans. The 
Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, aims to create a 
Eurasian trade route dominated by China and further expand and 
diversify the country’s economy.5 To help fund the infrastructural 
1  Ashley J. Tellis and Robert D. Blackwill, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” 
Council on Foreign Relations (April, 2015).
2  Xenia Wickett, John Nilsson-Wright and Tim Summers, “The Asia-Pacific Power Balance: 
Beyond the US-China Narrative,” Chatham House (September, 2015).
3  op. cit., fn. 1
4  Ely Ratner, “Course Correction: How to Stop China’s Maritime Advance,” Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 96, no. 4 (July/August, 2017): 64-72.
5  J.P. “What is China’s belt and road initiative: The many motivations behind Xi Jinping’s key 
foreign policy,” The Economist, May 15, 2017.
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while developing strength still influences Chinese strategic 
thought, the United States should interpret Chinese actions in 
Asia as attempts to increase its relative power over the US.
 Even if realist theory were untrue, East Asia is still the 
most important region for the United States’ global economic and 
security interests because of its economic capacity.16 The South 
China Sea is vital to the United States as it carries one-third of global 
maritime worth and provides access through the Indo-Pacific, 
another economically vibrant sub-region.17 Great powers also 
tend to entrench their influence by using regional institutions.18 
If China were to dominate this area, surrounding countries 
would succumb to Chinese pressure, harming the United States 
liberal international order. The authoritarian state of China holds 
less regard for human or political rights than the United States, 
and it has already showed signs of trying to impose its ways of 
domestic politics on its neighbors.19 Currently, China undergoes 
a forced migration of moving 250 million rural residents into 
newly constructed cities in order to ignite economic growth.20 
 Not only does the migration represent the CPC’s 
disregard for the individuality of China’s own citizens, it shows 
its willingness to assert authoritarian power in order to make 
economic gains. Since World War II, the United States has led 
the effort to create and expand open trade systems out of self-
interest.21 The success of a system like the Belt and Road Initiative 
or the solidification of power in the South China Sea could allow 
China to take a more leading role in this expansion, which it 
16  Ian Bremmer, Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World (New York, NY: 
Penguin Publishing Group, 2015)
17 op. cit., fn. 4
18  op. cit., fn. 6
19 op. cit., fn. 6
20  Ian Johnson, “China’s Great Uprooting: Moving 250 Million Into Cities,” The New York 
Times, June 15, 2013.
21  op. cit., fn. 7
achieve hegemony in Asia. This assumption is formed under the 
guidelines of renowned political scientist John Mearsheimer’s 
“offensive realism” theory, which assumes that states will seek 
to gain as much power as possible and pursue hegemony when 
the circumstances are right.11 Under these assumptions, China’s 
economic and military rise can be interpreted as an attempt 
to remove the United States from a position of dominance in 
the region and gain regional hegemony. Also following these 
assumptions, the United States needs to take steps to maintain 
economic, political and military balance in Asia in order to 
ensure China does not achieve its goal. Although there is 
a strong conception that the US exerts too much effort to 
project power around the globe, Mearsheimer presents a more 
focused strategy which he refers to as “offshore balancing.”12 
 The strategy identifies Asia as one region with the 
potential to produce a hegemon with “abundant economic clout” 
and ability to project power around the globe.13 Therefore, the 
United States must actively engage with countries throughout 
Asia to ensure a hegemon does not arise. China has explicitly 
stated it does not seek to remove the United States’ presence 
from the region, nor achieve hegemony, and to some, its actions 
in the South China Sea can be interpreted as no more than 
an attempt to guarantee its own free movement throughout 
the territory.14 Yet, another essential part of realist theory 
is that states do not and cannot know the true intentions of 
other states.15 Considering former Chinese president Deng 
Xiaoping’s dictum of laying low and hiding capabilities 
11  Ibid.
12  John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior 
U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 95, no. 4, (July/August, 2016): 70-83.
13  Ibid.
14  Steven F. Jackson, “Does China Have a Monroe Doctrine? Evidence for Regional 
Exclusion,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, no. 4 (November, 2016): 64-89.
15  op. cit., fn. 10
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continued without the United States, and on March 8, 2018, the 
remaining eleven countries signed the agreement renamed the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership.26
 The signing of the new Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement occurred around the same time President Trump 
unilaterally announced a massive tariff of 25% on imported 
steel and 10% on aluminum in the United States. He argued 
that the overcapacity in the market for these goods was due 
to China’s state-backed economic policies.27 To justify the 
import tariffs, President Trump ordered the US Department 
of Commerce to launch an investigation under Section 232 
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which has not been 
used since the creation of the WTO in 1995, on the effects of 
steel and aluminum on national security.28 If they were able 
to determine that the actions of China were a threat to the 
country’s security, the tariffs could be legally accepted. Oddly, 
China only accounts for 2% of US steel imports, so the tariffs 
are unlikely to inflict too much damage on its economy.29 
Yet President Trump continues to escalate tariffs in response to 
China’s “unfair retaliation.”30 When China published a list of 
$50 billion dollars of American products to be hit with tariffs on 
April 4, 2018, President Trump threatened additional tariffs on 
$100 billion of Chinese goods.31 President Trump also initiated 
an investigation into China’s alleged intellectual property 
theft under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 on August 
26 Eva Vergara and Luis A. Henao, “11 Nations sign Pacific trade pact as Trump plans US 
tariffs,” AP News, March 8, 2018.
27 Roncevert G. Almond, “Trump’s Trade War: A Contest for the Future of the President… and 
the World,” The Diplomat, March 14, 2018.
28 Ibid.
29 Alex He, “Intellectual Property will make or break US-China relations,” The Hill (March 22, 
2018).
30 Ana Swanson and Keith Bradsher, “Trump Doubles Down on Potential Trade War With 
China,” The New York Times,April 5, 2018.
31 Ibid.
could use to reflect its own interests. Given these circumstances, 
the United States must take concrete steps to maintain influence 
in Asia in order to balance China’s emerging power in the region. 
Thus, the rest of this paper will examine the actions of President 
Trump’s Administration that pertain to China’s emergence 
and the implications of these policies to determine how 
effectively they maintain balanced power with China in Asia.
The Trump Administration’s Policies Towards China and Asia
 President Trump began making serious decisions 
about the United States’ involvement in Asia on his first 
weekday of office. On January 23, 2017, President Trump 
withdrew the United States from the twelve country trade 
deal called the Trans-Pacific Partnership.22 The agreement was 
brokered by former president Barack Obama and intended to 
remove both “tariff and non-tariff trade barriers” between the 
twelve countries, including Japan and Australia, and decrease 
the Asian region’s economic dependence on China.23 In a 
memorandum released by the Office of the Press Secretary 
regarding the withdrawal, President Trump stated that trade 
is of “paramount importance” to his administration, but he 
would pursue trade on a more advantageous “bilateral” basis.24 
 On the other hand, The Congressional Research Service of 
the Library of Congress observed that the agreement could be used 
as a “vehicle to advance wider Asia-Pacific free trade area” and 
could “deepen U.S. integration in a vibrant region for the future.”25 
However, President Trump did not believe in these possibilities 
based on his executive decision to leave the TPP. The negotiations 
22  Peter Baker, “Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership: Obama’s Signature Trade Deal,” 
The New York Times, January 23, 2017.
23  Ibid.
24  Donald J. Trump, “Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement,” (memorandum, White 
House, Washington, DC, January 23, 2017).
25  Ian F. Fergusson, Mark A. McMinimy and Brock R. Williams, “The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP): In Brief,” Congressional Research Service (February 9, 2016).
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sophisticated” military assets onto its artificially created islands 
in the South China Sea.37 While the administration was more 
involved in other Asian affairs in 2017, moving forward it appears 
prepared to tackle the growing military threat that China presents. 
 The 2018 National Defense Strategy released by the 
Department of Defense clearly argues that China is coercing 
neighbors and pursuing a military modernization program to 
achieve “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony” in the near term and 
“displacement of the United States” in the future.38 Key objectives 
for the United States, according to the National Defense Strategy, 
include maintaining “favorable regional balances of power” in the 
Indo-Pacific and “defending allies from military aggression.”39 
Furthermore, the National Security Strategy of 2017 stated that 
in Asia, the United States would strengthen partnerships with 
countries like Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia 
to help them become “cooperative maritime partners.”40 
 Since releasing the National Defense Strategy, the 
administration has sent a US missile destroyer within 12 
nautical miles of the Chinese occupied Scarborough Shoal 
as a gesture to challenge its occupation.41 It has also sent 
Defense Secretary James Mattis to Indonesia and Vietnam. To 
afford using the military to counter China, President Trump 
also proposed a $716 billion increase in the defense budget 
for 2019 earlier this year.42 While President Trump’s military 
policies towards Asia are still developing, they appear strong 
37  Richard J. Heydarian, “The Trump Administration’s South China Sea Policy Takes Shape,” 
China-US Focus (February 2, 2018).
38  Department of Defense. 2018. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the 
United States of America. January 19.
39 Ibid.
40  President of the United States. 2017. National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America. December 18.
41  op. cit., fn. 37
42  David S. Cloud, “Trump proposes huge increase in military spending,” The Los Angeles 
Times, February 12, 2018.
14, 2017.32  Section 301 gives the US Trade Representative 
broad authority to take measures against a foreign countries 
unfair trade practices, of which President Trump accuses 
China of having.33 Specifically, the US is challenging China 
for performing forced technology transfers, where if a US 
company wishes to do business with other Chinese firms, they 
are forced to share their intellectual property. These United 
States investigations also bypass the World Trade Organization 
and could lead to broad sanctions and restrictions on China, 
which would provoke retaliatory measures against the US.34 
While President Trump’s economic policies surely 
intend to cause damage to China, it is unclear how much 
damage they will also inflict on the United States or other 
countries around the world. Officials have argued that while 
tariffs on Chinese goods do not intend to help American 
industry, they are necessary to prevent China from continuing 
to “violate international trade rules.”35 Rather than prompt 
China to change its behavior, the administration’s tariffs so 
far have sparked retaliation that especially targets American 
carmakers and soybean farmers.36 Whether the administration’s 
economic policies are attempts to actively maintain a regional 
balance in Asia or simply unilateral movements to encourage 
China to adapt to the rules of global institutions is unclear.
 Sticking to offensive realist theory, the United States 
also needs to balance Chinese military power. During Trump’s 
presidential tenure, China has continued to claim additional 
land territory, and the country has deployed “increasingly 
32  “USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of China,” (announcement, Office 
of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, DC, August 14, 2017).
33  op. cit., fn. 29
34  Ibid.
35 Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Ana Swanson, “Farmers’ Anger at Trump Tariffs Puts Republican 
Candidates in a Bind,” The New York Times, April 7, 2018.
36  Ibid.
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A realist perspective argues for the United States to consciously 
balance China’s rise by developing new, trusted strategic 
relationships throughout the Indo-Pacific region.48 Yet, 
President Trump’s economic policies have not succeeded in 
building these relationships. While the steel and aluminum 
tariffs are unlikely to affect China as much as other countries, 
they send a negative message about the United States’ trade 
policy and impede the ability to mount an effective coalition 
of countries to counter China’s unfair trade practices.49 Rather, 
they punish allies in North America and the European Union, 
causing political damage. It is likely that the US will need 
to strongly justify its tariffs on the basis of national defense 
in order to avoid going through a WTO dispute resolution 
process.50 If the US lost the legal battle, it would be required 
to remove the implementation of its steel and aluminum tariffs. 
The United States could ignore the ruling, but then 
other states could legally invoke countermeasures to the US 
imposed tariffs, sending the world down a dangerous path of 
protectionism.51 President Trump is correct to point out that 
China engages in unfair trade practices, but he addresses the 
problem in a harmful manner. In 2017, Xi Jinping became the 
first Chinese leader to attend the World Economic Forum, where 
he gave a keynote speech that notably condemned protectionist 
policies. In his speech, President Xi announced that China would 
remain “committed to promoting free trade and investment 
through opening up and saying no to protectionism.”52 As China 
follows the rest of the world by advancing free trade, it could be 
48  op. cit., fn. 1
49  Matthew P. Goodman and Ely Ratner, “A Better Way to Challenge China on Trade: Trump’s 
Harmful Tariffs Aren’t the Answer,” Foreign Affairs (March 22, 2018).
50  op. cit., fn. 27
51  Ibid.
52  Xi Jinping, “Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth,” 
(speech, World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, January 17, 2017).
and focused on maintaining a regional balance of power.
Implications of the Trump Administration’s Policies 
Towards China and Asia
Now that many of the Trump Administration’s significant policies 
directed at Asia have been presented, their implications can be 
analyzed. The first of President Trump’s economic decisions in 
Asia, the withdrawal of the US from TPP agreements, was not an 
effective approach at balancing China’s power in the region. For 
President Trump to keep the United States’ regional presence 
strong, one analyst argued, he would need to “expand economic 
and investment relations in Southeast Asia” and “provide further 
development assistance.”43 Although he pursues bilateral trade 
agreements with other states, President Trump has yet to find 
many countries willing to negotiate one.44 President Trump 
may not be successful in expanding economic relations in Asia 
because the world will continue lowering trade barriers with or 
without the United States.45 An obvious example of this is the 
fact that the other eleven countries signed the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. According to Joshua 
Meltzer, a senior fellow at Brookings Institution, the agreement 
is now a “trade-bloc that discriminates against the US.”46 He 
went on to say that the ability of the US to shape the rules of 
trade in the region is now diminished. Furthermore, the Chilean 
foreign minister recognized that the signing of the agreement 
was a strong sign by the countries involved against protectionist 
pressures and in favor of a world open to free trade.47 
43  Hang Nguyen, “The Obama Administration and Southeast Asia: Dynamics of a New 
Engagement,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. 29, no. 1/2 (June-December, 2016): 39-56. 
44  Doug Palmer, “Trump’s Asia trip highlights lack of trade deals,” Politico (November 8, 
2017). 
45  Joshua Kurlantzick, “The alternative paths of multilateral trade deals,” Aspenia Online 
(November 21, 2017).
46  op. cit., fn. 26
47  Ibid.
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would have been created by the original TPP to abide by them.
There appears to be a lack of trust with the Trump 
Administration in the multilateral institutions created under the 
US led liberal international order. As mentioned previously, 
the president recently took steps to include other countries in 
contesting military aggression in the South China Sea. But these 
actions are just one example of multilateral movement organized 
by the United States. The National Security Strategy and National 
Defense Strategy both call for team efforts with countries around 
Asia to prevent the formation of Chinese regional hegemony, 
but only time will tell if the president continues to pursue these 
policies in regards to military action. On the other hand, as 
detailed by President Trump’s major protectionist economic 
policies towards Asia, he wishes to go alone in stopping China’s 
economic coercion. The attitude of the administration runs 
the risk of the US approach towards balancing China being 
more confrontational than competitive.58 Here lies the most 
fatal flaw in all of President Trump’s policies towards Asia.
The failure in this policy is that the president is separating 
the United States from the liberal international order that China 
is abusing for its own benefit. Instead of attacking China, the 
United States should write new trade and investment rules for 
the twenty-first century.59 If President Trump’s new trade and 
investment rules follow a protectionist model, they will fail 
miserably. The rest of the world, including China, has explicitly 
shown that they will continue lowering trade barriers and 
interacting through multilateral fronts. This is evident through 
the signing of the CPTPP and the international support for China’ 
Belt and Road Initiative. Furthermore, the United States has 
already experienced backlash for protectionist proposals by the 
58  Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American 
Expectations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, no. 2 (March/April, 2018): 60-70.
59  Ibid.
detrimental to the United States to go the route of protectionism. 
The steel and aluminum tariffs have already sparked 
retaliation from states, but the Section 301 investigations 
could cause even more damage. If followed through, they will 
almost surely result in China responding with similar tariffs, 
damaging the US economy by raising consumer prices.53 
In a hearing before the Section 301 Committee Office of the 
United States Trade Representative, Scott Kennedy did argue 
that IP is an instrumental tool in a “larger contest of economic 
power” with China.54 However, Kennedy also claimed that 
if the United States “gives up efforts to create multilateral 
rules… it will leave wide swaths of global commerce 
with outdated rules or empty spaces without any rules.”55 
Rather than utilize multilateral rules and guidelines 
under the World Trade Organization, President Trump made 
a unilateral decision to attack China by launching the Section 
301 investigations. The administration should consider more 
effective ways to protect the intellectual property rights of 
Americans. Besides using the World Trade Organization to 
investigate China’s intellectual property theft, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership could have been an effective tool in preventing 
China from using its IP policies. The agreement’s high standards 
could have encouraged China to improve its practices regarding 
intellectual property.56 But when the United States abandoned the 
negotiations, the remaining countries removed the provisions on 
intellectual property that the US was demanding.57 By removing 
the provisions, China will not have to face the pressure that 
53  Daniel Rosen, “Is Trade War the Only Option? An Alternative Approach to Taking On 
China,” Foreign Affairs (March 20, 2018).
54  Scott Kennedy, “China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, 
Intellectual Property, and Innovation,” (testimony, Section 301 Committee Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, Washington, DC, October 10, 2017).
55  Ibid.
56 op. cit., fn. 29
57  op. cit., fn. 26
136 137
PAIDEIA VOLUME 5 China’s Regional Expansion
of US protectionism under President Donald Trump only 
assists China’s objective of achieving regional hegemony. US 
protectionist policies make it easier for China to gain economic 
dominance in Asia, which may lead to military dominance and 
the eventual removal of the United States presence in the region.
It is important to note that the theory followed in this 
paper is not the only framework for observing the situation in 
Asia. One could also follow defensive realist theory, which 
would still assume that China’s actions intend to increase its 
power. However, defensive realism would assume China will 
never seek to expand its power into global hegemony, and it 
will coexist peacefully with its neighbors and the United States. 
While an argument can be made for either side, or any other 
political framework of thought, the Asia-Pacific region is an 
especially important one to the United States for reasons other 
than preventing a hegemon from forming. It contains the biggest 
trade waterway in the world, the South China Sea, and the 
region’s most powerful country, China, is an authoritarian state. 
Without a United States presence in Asia it is impossible to 
know how China will mold the region. However, the possibility 
of an authoritarian wave led by China spreading throughout the 
continent should be enough to scare the United States into taking 
action. The United States created the liberal international order 
based on democracy after World War II and fought hard to expand 
it, so why turn back to protectionism now and run the risk of a 
Chinese regional hegemony reversing its vision for the world?
Trump Administration. As the leader of the current international 
order, the United States has the ability to help reshape the 
order, but it should not flip it on its head. It should strengthen 
the system to fix flaws that allow for Chinese coercion, but the 
United States should not go about it alone. Ian Bremmer argued 
for increased economic interdependence with China to ensure 
that any action China takes to destabilize the United States or 
its overseas interests will be met with a high cost.60 Slamming 
investigations and tariffs that attack China will only reduce 
economic interdependence, which makes it easier for China to 
economically coerce its neighbors without facing punishment.
The United States under President Trump heads in 
a direction that will result in the country’s presence in Asia 
being severely compromised. China is already the largest 
trading partner with many countries in Asia.61 Countries in 
Asia continue to increase economic interdependence while 
President Trump’s United States moves towards protectionism. 
If this trend continues and China completes its Belt and Road 
Initiative, it will become the center of trade across the entire 
Eurasian continent. China will also find it easier to bend its 
neighbors to its will with economic incentives. Not only will 
this further remove United States economic presence in Asia, it 
will make Indo-Pacific countries less inclined to prevent China’s 
military expansion in the South China Sea.62 Once this happens, 
the United States will only have its own military at its disposal, 
and it is difficult to imagine the United States starting an all 
out war with China. As Mearsheimer argues, there is military 
power and socioeconomic power, and socioeconomic power 
is what funds military power.63 Therefore, the continuation 
60  op. cit., fn. 16
61  op. cit., fn. 43
62  op. cit., fn. 1
63  op. cit., fn. 10
